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ABSTRACT¾Graham v. Connor established the modern 
constitutional landscape for police excessive force claims. The 
Supreme Court not only refined an objective reasonableness test to 
describe the constitutional standard, but also held that the Fourth 
Amendment is the sole avenue for courts to adjudicate claims that 
police violated a person’s constitutional rights in using force. In this 
Essay, we ask: What impact did this decision have on the nature of 
police excessive force claims in federal courts? To address this, we 
engaged in a qualitative examination of 500 federal cases (250 in the 
twenty-six years before Graham and 250 in the twenty-six years 
after) and coded for the types of claims brought by plaintiffs and 
recognized by federal courts. We find that prior to Graham, federal 
courts infrequently relied upon the Fourth Amendment in assessing 
police excessive force claims, a pattern that dramatically changed 
after the decision: only 28.0% of the pre-Graham cases include a 
discussion of the Fourth Amendment whereas 90.4% of the post-
Graham cases do. These findings suggest that the Supreme Court in 
Graham made a particular doctrinal choice in analyzing 
constitutional questions regarding police violence under the Fourth 
Amendment (which has an individualizing effect) instead of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and its potential 
to allow group-based and structural analysis—a move that did not 
reflect a preexisting trend or consensus in the federal courts. The 
Court’s doctrinal choice in Graham has contributed to the 
perpetuation of police excessive use of force in many communities of 
color. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent social movements, such as Black Lives Matter,1 have forced 
racialized2 police violence into public view.3 While an entrenched problem 
for communities of color,4 police officers’ use of excessive force that maims 
and kills briefly became visible in the media and public discourse due to 
protest and public mourning. Nonetheless, the numbers remain staggering 
even after the massive outpouring of activism and discussion over the past 
few years. And the issue is not improving as time goes on.5 
 
 1 See, e.g., Alicia Garza, A Herstory of the #BlackLivesMatter Movement by Alicia Garza, FEMINIST 
WIRE (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.thefeministwire.com/2014/10/blacklivesmatter-2 
[https://perma.cc/E7ZU-QQSN]. 
 2 See CENTER FOR POLICING EQUITY, THE SCIENCE OF JUSTICE: RACE, ARRESTS, AND POLICE USE 
OF FORCE 4 (2016) (“Even though this is a conservative estimate of bias, the analyses of 12 law 
enforcement departments from geographically and demographically diverse locations revealed that racial 
disparities in police use of force persist even when controlling for racial distribution of local arrest 
rates.”); Justin M. Feldman et al., Quantifying Underreporting of Law-Enforcement-Related Deaths in 
United States Vital Statistics and News-Media-Based Data Sources: A Capture–Recapture Analysis, 14 
PLOS MED. e1002449, 8–10 (2017) (finding that, in 2015, of a total of 1,086 cases, 27.1% of those killed 
by police were African-American, but only 13% of the U.S. population was African-American); see also 
Kimbriell Kelly et al., Fatal Shootings by Police Remain Relatively Unchanged After Two Years, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/fatal-shootings-by-police-
remain-relatively-unchanged-after-two-years/2016/12/30/fc807596-c3ca-11e6-9578-
0054287507db_story.html [https://perma.cc/5X2X-TPZ5] (“As was the case in 2015, a disproportionate 
number of those killed this year were black . . . .”); John Sullivan et al., Number of Fatal Shootings by 
Police is Nearly Identical to Last Year, WASH. POST (July 1, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/number-of-fatal-shootings-by-police-is-nearly-
identical-to-last-year/2017/07/01/98726cc6-5b5f-11e7-9fc6-c7ef4bc58d13_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/4RWN-EHHK ] (“[P]olice have continued to shoot and kill a disproportionately large 
number of black males, who account for nearly a quarter of the deaths, yet are only 6 percent of the 
nation’s population.”). 
 3 For an interesting discussion of the visibility of this issue over time, see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, 
WHEN POLICE KILL 3–11 (2017) (“The shooting of Michael Brown in August was followed by protests 
and pressure for criminal prosecution of the officer involved, and the angry visibility of the conflict in 
Ferguson, Missouri, generated sustained national attention. The months after the Ferguson episode saw 
local killings by police injected into a national conversation about police use of lethal force that was more 
sustained and intense than any before.”). 
 4 Nancy Krieger et al., Trends in US Deaths Due to Legal Intervention Among Black and White Men, 
Age 15-34 Years, by County Income Level: 1960-2010, 3 HARV. PUB. HEALTH REV., Jan. 2015, at 2; 
George Yancy & Judith Butler, What’s Wrong With ‘All Lives Matter’?, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Jan. 
12, 2015, 9:00 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/12/whats-wrong-with-all-lives-
matter [https://perma.cc/5U8G-BXUH] (“When we are ta[l]king about racism, and anti-black racism in 
the United States, we have to remember that under slavery black lives were considered only a fraction of 
a human life, so the prevailing way of valuing lives assumed that some lives mattered more, were more 
human, more worthy, more deserving of life and freedom, where freedom meant minimally the freedom 
to move and thrive without being subjected to coercive force. But when and where did black lives ever 
really get free of coercive force?”). 
 5 In 2015, 995 people were killed, in 2016, 963, and in 2017, 987. 2015 Fatal Force Database, 
WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings 
[https://perma.cc/VZ2T-FUXF]; 2016 Fatal Force Database, WASH. POST, 
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The data that have been recently collected, along with the history of 
police engagement with communities of color, highlight how the problem of 
excessive force is an iteration of the racial subordination that these 
communities experience across a host of social, political, and economic 
issues. For example, researchers at Boston University School of Public 
Health developed a structural racism index that took into account residential 
segregation, incarceration rates, educational attainment, economic 
indicators, and employment status and found that states with higher racial 
disparities in these areas also had greater Black/White disparities in fatal 
police shootings of unarmed victims.6 Thus, there is a link between the 
structural and environmental conditions that minorities experience and the 
ways in which these communities are policed. As Paul Butler notes in his 
book Chokehold: Policing Black Men, “what happens in places like 
Ferguson, Missouri, and Baltimore, Maryland—where the police routinely 
harass and discriminate against African Americans—is not a flaw in the 
criminal justice system. Ferguson and Baltimore are examples of how the 
system is supposed to work.”7 
Yet, what is puzzling about the legal and public discourse on police 
violence is that it has largely been framed as a problem of individual “bad 
apples”—rogue officers who harbor animosity or fail to adhere to department 
regulations—or departmental shortcomings such as poor training or lack of 
clear policies. The primary narrative surrounding the issue of police 
excessive force appears to be one of differential legal and policy compliance: 
police enforce use of force policies and norms in a largely humane manner 
for Whites, and in more brutal ways for racial minorities.8 
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings-2016 [https://perma.cc/GQ8G-
CJF4]; 2017 Fatal Force Database, WASH. POST, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings-2017 [https://perma.cc/JNE2-
RZTJ]. 
 6 Aldina Mesic et al., The Relationship Between Structural Racism and Black-White Disparities in 
Fatal Police Shootings at the State Level, 110 J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N 106, 113 (2018). The authors note: 
Among the state racism measure, racial residential segregation was the most robust indicator 
associated with state-level racial disparities in police shootings of unarmed victims. Many previous 
studies have shown that racial residential segregation is associated with a series of adverse health 
outcomes. Racial residential segregation is the primary basis for a range of social, economic, 
employment, educational, criminal justice and political inequalities between Blacks and Whites. 
Therefore, racial residential segregation may be the most fundamental indicator of longstanding 
structural racism, which could explain our finding that this measure was [the] single best predictor 
of the racial disparity in fatal police shootings of unarmed victims. 
Id. 
 7 PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 6 (2017). 
 8 Mesic et al., supra note 6, at 114 (noting that “[t]here is experimental evidence from computer 
simulation studies to support the hypothesis that implicit racial biases influence police officers’ decisions 
whether to shoot unarmed suspects. There is also evidence from investigations of actual police incidents 
that police are more likely to use lethal force with black suspects than white suspects. Our findings suggest 
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This understanding of police brutality treats issues of race, racism, and 
differential compliance as matters that exist outside of the (presumably) 
otherwise benign legal structures that shape how police operate. However, 
this construction fails to acknowledge how our constitutional structures 
channel the issue of police excessive force into particular legal terrains while 
signaling that other terrains are not viable. The prescriptive power of the 
Supreme Court has entrenched a knowledge and discourse around police 
violence that confines it solely to the territory of what we term the 
individualizing Fourth Amendment,9 which is a constitutional terrain that 
stands in opposition to acknowledging the pervasive racialized tensions 
between police and racial minorities that underlie many violent police 
interactions. 
Specifically, through the pivotal police excessive force case of Graham 
v. Connor, the Court made a particular and consequential choice by 
funneling the diverse means by which federal courts had been adjudicating 
excessive force claims into one singular avenue.10 This holding dictated, as 
a matter of legal doctrine, that the constitutional standard for addressing all 
matters of police violence and excessive force is found solely in the Fourth 
Amendment, which frames the issue of excessive police force as one 
between the state and aggrieved individuals and eschews other relevant 
constitutional avenues such as the Fourteenth Amendment—an approach 
that has the potential to be more capable of dealing with group-based harms 
and structural forms of oppression.11 By individualizing police violence and 
scaling it down from a structural matter steeped in centuries of racial tensions 
to an individual dispute between officer and citizen, the Fourth Amendment 
has been used to depoliticize, deracialize, decontextualize, and ahistoricize a 
distinctive racial justice issue concerning the disproportionate use of force 
against people of color. This individualizing dynamic not only warps our 
 
that the degree of racial bias among police officers in a state may be related to underlying levels of 
structural racism in that state”).  
 9 “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 10 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (“This case requires us to decide what constitutional standard governs a 
free citizen’s claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, 
investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of his person. We hold that such claims are properly analyzed under 
the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a substantive due process 
standard.”). 
 11 Here, we emphasize the word “potential,” as the Fourteenth Amendment, and equal protection in 
particular, currently has significant limitations that prevent it from being used in the liberating manner 
that we signal. This is discussed further in our Conclusion. 
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understanding of the causes and consequences of police violence, but often 
leaves victims without any remedy. 
With this Essay, we engage in an empirical examination of how 
Graham v. Connor led federal courts to have a reductionist understanding of 
police excessive force, and what this means for victims and plaintiffs. Part I 
briefly describes the history of the Fourth Amendment and how its 
individualist leanings were “baked in” by the Framers. Part II outlines both 
Supreme Court case law and the scholarly literature concerning police 
violence and use of force, which positions Graham as a transformative case 
that filters all matters pertaining to excessive police force through a Fourth 
Amendment lens. Part III discusses our original qualitative study of federal 
police violence cases pre- and post-Graham. This suggests that, with 
Graham, the Court effectively cordoned off other areas of constitutional law 
that have the potential to take structural dynamics into account (e.g., the 
Equal Protection Clause), yet nonetheless suffer from their own limitations. 
In our conclusion, we contend that Graham v. Connor, in combination with 
key equal protection cases of the era—namely, Washington v. Davis12 and 
McCleskey v. Kemp13—reflects a broader ideological shift toward 
constitutional individualism when adjudicating matters dealing with race and 
racism. A more thoughtful engagement with social science methods and data 
across constitutional spaces dealing with racial disparities may lead to 
jurisprudential reconsiderations that can provide relief in the areas of police 
excessive force and beyond. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INDIVIDUALIZING FOURTH AMENDMENT 
This Part briefly argues that the Fourth Amendment is an area of 
constitutional law that is structurally unsuited to address racialized group 
harm—an evaluation that is necessary for understanding the nature of police 
violence today. This argument proceeds in three parts: (a) the Fourth 
Amendment is part of the Bill of Rights, which is a rights-granting 
framework largely based on the conception of singular individuals being 
provided singular rights; (b) the history and language of the Fourth 
Amendment both suggest a lack of structural awareness and a tuning to 
individual needs instead of group harm; and (c) the language and frameworks 
used in key criminal procedure cases decided during the modern era indicate 
that the Court continues to consider these issues—including police excessive 
force—as a matter solely between an individual citizen and a state actor. 
 
 12 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 13 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
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A. The Bill of Rights Preserves and Prioritizes Individual Rights 
The Framers mirrored the Bill of Rights on British attempts to 
“prescribe the individual rights of the citizenry.”14 In essence, the Bill of 
Rights—based on common law, the Magna Carta, and other English law, as 
well as early colonial declarations discussing individual rights—provides 
citizens with individuated rights vis-à-vis the state.15 Certainly, the Bill of 
Rights is aware of some group concerns, such as the freedoms afforded 
religious groups under the First Amendment. Nevertheless, the overall 
structure of the Bill of Rights deals largely with distinctively individualized 
concerns and speaks to the particular dynamic between an individual and the 
federal government. 
Consistent with these early sources, the Fourth Amendment epitomizes 
the individual-rights-focused nature of the Bill of Rights. Its inclusion as part 
of the Bill of Rights suggests that its provisions have an inherently limited 
scope, designed primarily to afford only atomized individuals—not 
groups—safeguards against federal power.16 These individualized 
protections against the federal government were incorporated via the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to also offer protections 
against state governments.17 In other terms, the Fourth Amendment, like the 
rest of the Bill of Rights, gives (in theory) “all” citizens individuated rights 
to be free from certain state conduct—i.e., a set of negative freedoms.18 
 
 14 Joyce A. McCray Pearson, The Federal and State Bills of Rights: A Historical Look at the 
Relationship Between America’s Documents of Individual Freedom, 36 HOW. L.J. 43, 45 (1993). 
 15 HON. GREGORY M. CASKEY, CALIFORNIA SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1:2 (2017); see also 1 JAMES 
BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 357 (American ed. 1888) (stating that the “ten amendments 
made immediately after the adoption of the Constitution . . . constitute what the Americans, following the 
English precedent, call a Bill of Rights, securing the individual citizen and the States against the 
encroachments of Federal power”); McCray Pearson, supra note 14, at 49 (describing early charters and 
statutes in colonial America—such as Rhode Island’s Charter (1663) or the Pennsylvania Charter of 
Privileges (1701)—enumerating rights and serving as the predecessors to a federal “Bill of Rights.”). 
“The common thread in all of these documents is the borrowed idea of liberty from both sides of the 
Atlantic, creating a strong Anglo-American doctrinal concept of individual liberty.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 16 LOUISE I. CAPEN & D. MONTFORT MELCHIOR, MY WORTH TO THE WORLD: STUDIES IN 
CITIZENSHIP 469 (1935) (“The first ten [amendments]—commonly called the Bill of Rights—guarantee 
certain rights to the individual.”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, 120 YALE 
L.J. 1734, 1772 (2011) (“The Amendment affirmed a general right of Americans to be secure against 
unreasonable searches and seizures of ‘their persons, houses, papers, and effects.’ The word ‘property’ 
itself went unmentioned and was swept into the catchall category of all ‘effects.’ But intrusions upon 
individual bodies—‘persons’—raised special concerns. As with privacy more generally, bodies are 
distributed in egalitarian fashion; the rich man and the poor man alike each has one body, one ‘person’ 
entitled to special Fourth Amendment solicitude.” (emphasis added)). 
 17 In the Fourth Amendment context, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 18 Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People Back into the Fourth Amendment, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
359, 360 (1994) (“[M]uch of the amendment’s jurisprudence centers on the courts’ efforts to regulate law 
enforcement activity that intrudes upon protected rights of privacy and liberty.”); see, e.g., Olmstead v. 
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B. The Language and History of the Fourth Amendment Illustrate Its 
Individualized Focus 
As a second point, the language and history of the Fourth Amendment 
points to an individualized right as well. The Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.19 
The Fourth Amendment thus guarantees a generalized right held by everyone 
(i.e., “the people”) to individually be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures in their singular “persons” and their singular private properties (e.g., 
“houses, papers, and effects”).20 Moreover, the Amendment arose, at least in 
part, as a response to certain searches and seizures practiced in colonial 
America, namely the “writ of assistance.”21 This history suggests that the 
Fourth Amendment evolved out of a particular desire to stop government 
searches and seizures of persons and property conducted without a warrant 
or probable cause.22 Thus, both the language of the Fourth Amendment and 
its underlying historical rationale suggest that its protections extend to an 
individual seeking legal shelter from undue governmental searches and 
seizures. 
C. Modern Criminal Procedure Doctrine Maintains the Individualized 
Focus of the Fourth Amendment 
Lastly, even when expanding rights in the criminal procedure realm, the 
Supreme Court has not deviated from this individualized framework in the 
 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (classically framing it as the “right to 
be let alone”). 
 19 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 20 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1177 (1991) (“Even 
more important, in the Fourth Amendment, as nowhere else in the Constitution, the collective-sounding 
phrase ‘the people’ is immediately qualified by the use and subsequent repetition of the more 
individualistic language of ‘persons.’”). 
 21 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1(a) 
(5th ed. 2012) (“The writ of assistance, seldom used in England, was utilized by customs officers to enter 
and search buildings for smuggled goods.”); Bacigal, supra note 18 at 364; George C. Thomas III, 
Stumbling Toward History: The Framers’ Search and Seizure World, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 199, 206 
(2010) (“The history is clear that the colonists were hostile to British searches under the infamous writs 
of assistance. These searches required neither a warrant nor probable cause.”). 
 22 See, e.g., Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 463 (majority opinion) (“The well known historical purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment, directed against general warrants and writs of assistance, was to prevent the use of 
governmental force to search a man’s house, his person, his papers and his effects; and to prevent their 
seizure against his will.”); Thomas, supra note 21, at 206. 
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context of search and seizure. Specifically, during the mid-century Warren 
Court era, when the Court stimulated a then-new constitutional discourse on 
police activity,23 particularly regarding searching24 and seizing25 individual 
citizens, the constitutional discourse remained focused on cognizing Fourth 
Amendment protections as individuated. Put differently, even as the Fourth 
Amendment paradigm became one in which “courts use the Constitution as 
the primary means of regulating the police,” the scope remained fixed on the 
individual person who had her rights violated and could bring an 
individuated claim for that violation.26 Hence, while the Court expanded 
rights and remedies, it did not disrupt the overarching and inherent narrative 
of the individualized Fourth Amendment schema. These cases limited 
alternative means of addressing the group-based harm that fundamentally 
characterizes racialized police violence by ensuring that isolated criminal 
cases and civil suits are the only means to seek remedies.27 
 It is clear from these cases that the Fourth Amendment exists within 
an individualizing constitutional terrain that focuses primarily on whether a 
given search or seizure is a reasonable intrusion against the privacy interests 
of an individual, whether it be her person, her home, or her items.28 The 
 
 23 Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 765 (2012) (“By expanding 
constitutional rights, the Court brought constitutional law to bear directly on police officers and 
departments. By augmenting constitutional remedies, the Court facilitated court challenges to police 
conduct. And by justifying its sweeping action on the ground that local and state governments had failed 
to prevent police misconduct, the Court established the primacy of constitutional adjudication for 
regulating the police.”). 
 24 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (“Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives 
to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less 
than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary 
in the true administration of justice.” (emphasis added)). 
 25 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully 
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own 
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of 
law.” (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (emphasis added)). 
 26 Harmon, supra note 23, at 765. 
 27 Id. at 765–67; Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 
86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1157–58 (1998) (“Rather than meet racism head on, the Court began to fight it 
indirectly through general constitutional standards that did not explicitly address race but that were 
nonetheless calculated to constrain racially motivated policies.”). 
 28 Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment as a Collective Right, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 255, 256 
(2010) (“For most of the history of the United States, the view that the Fourth Amendment served to 
protect individual security—that it was an individual right—was so patently obvious that it needed no 
support.”); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment: History, Purpose, and Remedies, 43 TEX. TECH 
L. REV. 1, 5 (2010) (“[I]n case after case, the Court has emphasized that the overarching principle of the 
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (stating 
that “the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against . . . 
physically intrusive governmental conduct” and therefore is the proper constitutional site for police 
violence cases); Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1276 
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Amendment deals with the relationship between an individual citizen and the 
state, delimiting the power of the state—via the police—to invade that 
person’s privacy through a search or seizure, requiring protections like 
individualized suspicion and particularity in warrants that specify who the 
individual is that the state is acting upon.29 It concerns a one-to-one dynamic 
between the state and a citizen that limits the matter solely to the protection 
and constitutional articulation of that singular citizen’s individualized rights 
and remedies.30 This individualized understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment, and its associated limitations, has been mapped onto police 
violence cases concerning use of force. Excessive force analyses now exist 
exclusively in the domain of the Fourth Amendment and, as a result, the 
individualized relationship between the harmed civilian and the rights-
violating state. According to this framework, deadly force constitutes a 
seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes and is therefore “subject to the 
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”31 
Consequently, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, particularly as it 
relates to excessive force claims, presents a discursive and doctrinal 
limitation that constrains the issue of police use of excessive force solely to 
individual rights that are abridged by unwarranted state intervention. Due to 
this limitation, as an individualized constitutional doctrine, the Fourth 
Amendment is simply not designed to address the group inequalities and 
racial dynamics that characterize police violence today. 
 
(2016) (“The right to be protected within one’s home included the right not to be subject to promiscuous 
search and seizure. The government thus could not, at will, search an individual’s ‘person, his houses, his 
papers, and all his possessions.’”). 
 29 M. Blane Michael, Reading the Fourth Amendment: Guidance from the Mischief that Gave It 
Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 921–22 (2010) (“The Fourth Amendment was thus adopted for the purpose 
of checking discretionary police authority, and that historical purpose should be kept in mind.”). 
 30 See Clancy, supra note 28, at 255 (“[T]he Amendment has been traditionally interpreted to 
safeguard the rights of individuals in atomistic spheres of interests . . . .” (emphasis added)); Tracey 
Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 198–99 (1993) 
(“Whether a particular search or seizure is reasonable is generally determined by balancing the competing 
interests at stake—the government’s interest in effective law enforcement versus the individual’s interest 
in privacy and personal security.”); Robert Weisberg, Foreword: A New Agenda for Criminal Procedure, 
2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV 367, 368 (1999) (“[C]riminal procedure addresses a distinct and fundamental 
political conflict at the heart of American constitutionalism—the condemnatory and physical power of 
state versus the individual.”). 
 31 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). 
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II. POLICE EXCESSIVE FORCE: SUPREME COURT CASE LAW AND THE 
SCHOLARLY LITERATURE 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Graham v. Connor,32 federal 
courts used a variety of legal mechanisms to assess claims that a particular 
use of force by the police violated the Constitution. In Graham, the Supreme 
Court brought uniformity to this area of law by stating that all excessive force 
claims should be analyzed through the Fourth Amendment.33 In line with this 
doctrinal shift, post-Graham legal scholarship discussing police violence and 
constitutional law also reflects this emphasis.34 As a result, what we have is 
federal courts engaging in a hyper-focus on the Fourth Amendment post-
Graham, and scholars not fully exploring the fact that it has not always been 
this way or the implications of this particular doctrinal choice.35 This Part 
illustrates these developments by (a) describing the jurisprudential strategies 
prior to the Court’s decision in Graham, (b) surveying the relevant 
scholarship evaluating these cases, and (c) briefly noting the implications of 
these gaps in the conversations. 
A. Key Cases on Police Use of Force: Garner to Graham 
Tennessee v. Garner36 and Graham v. Connor37 represent the two 
foundational cases in this area. In Garner, the Court held:  
[I]f the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to 
believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened 
 
 32 490 U.S. at 388 (“This case requires us to decide what constitutional standard governs a free 
citizen’s claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, 
investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of his person. We hold that such claims are properly analyzed under 
the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a substantive due process 
standard.”). 
 33 See Part III for our qualitative findings. 
 34 See infra Section II.B. 
 35 In addition, the Court rarely discusses police violence. See John P. Gross, Judge, Jury, and 
Executioner: The Excessive Use of Deadly Force by Police Officers, 21 TEX. J. ON CIV. LIBERTIES & CIV. 
RTS. 155, 157 (2016) (“The United States Supreme Court seldom addresses the issue of police officer use 
of force; when the issue is addressed, legal justifications for the use of force, and the limitations on when 
the use of force is appropriate are not analyzed or discussed in any great detail.”). Furthermore, the lack 
of scholarly engagement may be because the Court so clearly established that there is no place for the 
Fourteenth Amendment in police excessive force analyses, because scholars do not believe that the 
Fourteenth Amendment has a role in these cases, or because they do not see police killings as a pressing 
social problem. See ZIMRING, supra note 3, at 8–9 (“The published record of legal journals provides 
another indication of the low visibility of police killings as a focus of critical concern and scholarly 
activity.”). 
 36 471 U.S. 1. 
 37 490 U.S. 386. 
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infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to 
prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given.38  
By saying that police could not use deadly force unless the person posed a 
threat of death or physical injury, the Court clearly stated that deadly force 
should not be used against a fleeing, unarmed person.39 
Garner is praised by critics of the Court’s subsequent Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence as a case that actually created a bright-line rule 
designed to regulate fatal force.40 However, Garner, via Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor’s dissent, also signaled a more limited future trajectory for how 
the Court would regard the problem of police violence. O’Connor’s dissent 
set the stage for what was to come for police violence jurisprudence.41 In her 
dissent, O’Connor began to sketch a different reasonableness standard: 
“[T]he reasonableness of Officer Hymon’s conduct for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment cannot be evaluated by what later appears to have been 
a preferable course of police action.”42 O’Connor contended that the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit an officer from using deadly force in such a 
scenario, in contrast to the majority.43 
The Graham Court used this Fourth Amendment philosophy articulated 
in Justice O’Connor’s dissent to push police excessive force doctrine in a 
more restricted direction that focused solely on a reasonableness standard 
rather than bright-line rules that actually restrict police use of force. Yet, the 
Court did not explicitly overrule Garner.44 The Graham case arose when 
 
 38 471 U.S. at 11–12; see ZIMRING, supra note 3, at 19 (“As a matter of constitutional principle, the 
Garner case was a decisive rejection of generalized law enforcement authority to use force as also a 
justification for killings by police . . . .”). 
 39 Garner, 471 U.S. at 3, 11 (“The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, 
whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. It is not better that all felony suspects die 
than that they escape. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, 
the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.”). 
 40 Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211, 216 
(2017) (calling Garner “a high-water mark” for police violence case law); Nancy C. Marcus, From 
Edward to Eric Garner and Beyond: The Importance of Constitutional Limitations on Lethal Use of Force 
in Police Reform, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 53, 80, 82 (2016). 
 41 Garner, 471 U.S. at 29 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 40, at 217 
(describing how the flexible “totality of the circumstances” standard, including the discussion of “split-
second” decisions from Graham, “originat[ed] in Justice Sandra Day O’Conn[o]r’s dissent in Garner, 
[and] has animated the Court’s excessive-force case law ever since”). 
 42 Garner, 471 U.S. at 29 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 43 Id. at 23 (“By disregarding the serious and dangerous nature of residential burglaries and the 
longstanding practice of many States, the Court effectively creates a Fourth Amendment right allowing a 
burglary suspect to flee unimpeded from a police officer who has probable cause to arrest, who has 
ordered the suspect to halt, and who has no means short of firing his weapon to prevent escape. I do not 
believe that the Fourth Amendment supports such a right, and I accordingly dissent.”). 
 44 Marcus, supra note 40, at 82–83 (describing the progression of police violence case law from 
Garner through Scott v. Harris in 2007 as never actually abrogating or overruling Garner). 
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Dethorne Graham—an African-American man and diabetic—attempted to 
get orange juice from a convenience store when a cop “became suspicious” 
because he saw Graham enter and leave the store quickly.45 The officer 
cuffed Graham and continuously failed to respond to the fact that Graham 
was having an insulin reaction; Graham sustained multiple injuries during 
the encounter.46 Graham filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the 
police had used excessive force against him in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.47 The district court found for the police, applying a four-factor 
test from Johnson v. Glick.48 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court 
ruling, with Graham arguing that it was error to require that excessive force 
must be “applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm” in order to have 
a successful claim.49 
The Supreme Court held that excessive force “claims are properly 
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ 
standard, rather than under a substantive due process standard.”50 In vacating 
and remanding, the Court clarified that the Glick test should not be followed, 
and that the “objective reasonableness” standard should be used instead.51 
The “reasonableness” of use of force, to the Court, requires avoiding the 
“20/20 vision of hindsight” by looking at the events from the perspective of 
a “reasonable officer on the scene,” while taking into account the fact that 
officers make “split-second judgments” in “circumstances that are tense, 
uncertain, and rapidly evolving.”52 In so doing, the Court solidified the 
Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness” standard as the only way to 
evaluate police excessive force in the context of effectuating an arrest, while 
avoiding creating any bright-line rules to actually guide officers in using 
force.53 In effect, Graham would get the Court out of the business of making 
 
 45 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388–89 (1989). 
 46 Id. at 389–90. 
 47 Id. at 390. 
 48 Id.; Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) (The test used in Glick instructed: “In 
determining whether the constitutional line has been crossed, a court must look to such factors as the need 
for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the 
extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore 
discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm”), overruled by Graham, 
490 U.S. 386. 
 49 Graham, 490 U.S. at 391. 
 50 Id. at 388. The Court notes that in excessive force claims made in response to an arrest, the Fourth 
Amendment is the exclusive mechanism. See id. at 394. For excessive force claims made by persons who 
are criminally convicted and incarcerated, the Eight Amendment applies. See id. 
 51 Id. at 399. 
 52 Id. at 396–97. 
 53 Scott v. Harris in 2007 only furthered this trend. See 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (“Although 
respondent’s attempt to craft an easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context is admirable, 
in the end we must still slosh our way through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’ Whether or not 
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any real decisions on what constitutes unconstitutional use of force, as it 
arguably did in Garner. 
B. Scholarship on Police Use of Force 
Generally speaking, scholarship on police use of force in the 
constitutional law space remains relatively sparse.54 Existing literature 
discussing police violence and constitutional law provides important 
critiques of Supreme Court case law and the limitations and flaws therein. 
However, the literature remains primarily critical of the Fourth Amendment, 
with little discussion of the potential of the Fourteenth Amendment—
specifically, equal protection—to address the use of force as an issue that 
implicates racialized group dynamics or social structures that replicate 
inequality in the shadow of the country’s longstanding race problems.55 
 
Scott’s actions constituted application of ‘deadly force,’ all that matters is whether Scott’s actions were 
reasonable.” (emphasis added)); Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 40, at 217 (“The turn away from Garner 
was cemented by the Court’s 2007 decision in Scott v. Harris, which reinforced the approach in Graham 
by holding that there are no clearly impermissible uses of deadly force.”). 
 54 Police violence remains an undertheorized and underdiscussed issue in general in legal 
scholarship. See, e.g., ZIMRING, supra note 3, at 8–9 (describing the “[a]bsence of [l]egal [s]cholarship” 
on police violence); Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 
1122–23 (2008) (discussing the fact that legal scholars—criminal procedure scholars in particular—have 
focused primarily on other facets of policing apart from use of force). 
 55 See e.g., Linda Sheryl Greene, Before and After Michael Brown—Toward an End to Structural 
and Actual Violence, 49 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2015) (focusing less on the particular role of 
constitutional law but arguing that “individual instances of police deadly force against unarmed Black 
men are enabled by a legal jurisprudence of structural violence which provides no accountability for the 
societal marginalization and stigmatization of young Black men, as well as by a jurisprudence of actual 
violence, which permits police officers to decide whom to target and whom to kill with virtually no threat 
of criminal sanction or institutional civil liability”). But see Wayne C. Beyer, Police Misconduct: Claims 
and Defenses Under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, 30 URB. 
LAW. 65, 65 (1998) (“Second to the Fourth Amendment’s protection from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses furnish the greatest 
protection from police abuse.”); Blanche Bong Cook, Biased and Broken Bodies of Proof: White 
Heteropatriarchy, the Grand Jury Process, and Performance on Unarmed Black Flesh, 85 UMKC L. 
REV. 567, 621 (2017) (engaging in a brief discussion of equal protection in the context of police violence); 
Zach Newman, Note, “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot”: Policing, Fatal Force, and Equal Protection in the Age 
of Colorblindness, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 117, 136–42 (2015) (discussing how the Supreme Court 
has largely foreclosed the possibility of mobilizing the Equal Protection Clause (in part, due to the intent 
doctrine introduced in Washington v. Davis) in the context of police violence). Additionally, while not 
necessarily pertaining directly to Graham and fatal force usage, interesting discussions of the role of the 
Fourth Amendment in precipitating violent interchanges between citizens and police are emerging, 
especially in Devon Carbado’s scholarship. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People 
to Killing Black People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 
127 (2017) [hereinafter Carbado, Fourth Amendment Pathways]; Devon W. Carbado, Predatory Policing, 
85 UMKC L. REV. 545, 546 (2017) [hereinafter Carbado, Predatory Policing] (“A variety of social forces 
(including broken windows policing, racial stereotypes, racial segregation, and Fourth Amendment law) 
converge to make African-Americans vulnerable to ongoing police surveillance and contact.” (emphasis 
added)). Finally, see Jack Glaser’s scholarship on racial profiling as an important element of the process 
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As an example of the nature of recent scholarship in this area, Rachel 
Harmon writes that the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
is “deeply impoverished” and “incomplete and indeterminate.”56 To Harmon, 
a reasonable use of force under the Fourth Amendment must be understood 
as existing only in response to an “imminent threat,” where the force is 
necessary in terms of “degree and kind” and the harm to the citizen is not 
“substantially disproportionate” to the harm it tries to prevent.57 In devising 
a new standard under the Fourth Amendment, Harmon contends that the 
Fourth Amendment can be improved by incorporating the concepts of 
imminence, necessity, and proportionality that are part of a justification 
defense in criminal law.58 
Brandon Garrett and Seth Stoughton contend that the Fourth 
Amendment can be resurrected into a more tactical and effective 
constitutional framework that actually protects citizens.59 To these authors, 
Graham and its progeny are “counterproductive,” having hindered sound 
police tactics and training and “confounding efforts to draft clear use-of-
force policies.”60 They argue that, despite this, “Fourth Amendment use-of-
force doctrine can be reimagined” and, if courts fail to do their job of 
incorporating good tactics into Fourth Amendment doctrine, the Amendment 
will “fade into irrelevance.”61 Finally, like other scholarship noted here, 
Garrett and Stoughton contend that Tennessee v. Garner provides “crucial 
insights” that have been lost and “need to be recovered.”62 
Similarly, Nancy Marcus argues that Garner should be revived in the 
Fourth Amendment context, with the goal that it serve to define police 
violence case law instead of Graham.63 “[T]he Supreme Court, upon 
addressing the circumstances of his death by police shooting, set forth a firm 
rule of law establishing that shooting at unarmed or otherwise dangerous 
fleeing suspects as a method of stopping them from escaping is prohibited 
 
of deciding whom to stop (and potentially subject to force) as well as L. Song Richardson and Phillip 
Goff’s scholarship on suspicion heuristics. JACK GLASER, SUSPECT RACE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
OF RACIAL PROFILING 21–41 (2015); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the 
Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 295–96 (2012). 
 56 Harmon, supra note 54, at 1119–20. 
 57 Id. at 1120. 
 58 Id. at 1124. 
 59 Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 40, at 213–14. 
 60 Id. at 217. 
 61 Id. at 214. 
 62 Id. at 224. 
 63 Marcus, supra note 40, at 82; see also Nancy C. Marcus, Out of Breath and Down to the Wire: A 
Call for Constitution-Focused Police Reform, 59 HOW. L.J. 5, 38 (2015) (making similar contentions 
regarding the importance of Garner). 
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by the Constitution.”64 To Marcus, Garner represents a clear rule precluding 
lethal force in certain situations, unlike the abstract vagaries of Graham.65 
We can use Garner while criticizing Graham, Marcus contends.66 In other 
words, Garner should “not be thrown out with the bathwater” despite the 
failure of Graham.67 In a similar vein, John Gross contends that the Supreme 
Court has produced a standard of review that is “highly deferential” to police 
and has failed to provide “meaningful guidance” on when deadly force is 
allowed.68 Gross further argues that the Fourth Amendment “insulates” 
officers from liability through the reasonableness standard.69 To Gross, this 
all makes it an “uphill battle” to bring a § 1983 suit alleging a constitutional 
violation.70 
To be sure, scholars have certainly looked at how issues of race and 
racism interact with policing practices shaped by the Fourth Amendment. 
For example, Devon Carbado and Patrick Rock argue:  
[F]or all the discussions we have had about race and excessive force over the 
past decade, our understanding of the phenomenon has not much improved. In 
part, this is because we continue to frame excessive force as a problem that 
derives from rogue police officers who harbor racial animus against African 
Americans.71  
Carbado and Rock caution that such framings ignore the structural 
dimensions of police violence. They then leverage recent findings in social 
psychology to draw attention to the complexity of the cognitive processes 
leading up to violent encounters. Carbado writes in a separate piece about 
policing procedures permitted by the Fourth Amendment (such as racial 
profiling) that allow the police to “force interactions with African Americans 
with little or no basis”72 that often end violently. Carbado then lays out how 
the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment allows for various forms 
of racial profiling and thus “facilitates the precarious line between stopping 
black people and killing black people.”73 
 
 64 Marcus, supra note 40, at 55–56 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985)). 
 65 Id. at 82. 
 66 Id. (“Not only is it possible for police reform advocates hoping to rein in excessive police violence 
to simultaneously criticize the vagueness of the Graham and embrace the central holding of Garner, it 
makes sense to do so.”). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Gross, supra note 35, at 155–56. 
 69 Id. at 165. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans to Police Violence, 
51 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 159, 161 (2016). 
 72 Carbado, Fourth Amendment Pathways, supra note 55, at 127. 
 73 Id. at 129. 
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Other scholars have made similar important points about how the 
Fourth Amendment codifies rather than checks the ability of police officers 
to disproportionately harass people of color.74 This work has been important, 
if not transformative, in its insistence that police violence is a deep-seated 
structural problem facilitated by the Fourth Amendment rather than an 
aberration to an otherwise neutral jurisprudence. However, this literature has 
largely examined how the Fourth Amendment precipitates disproportionate 
police contact with people of color, which allows officers’ individual bias 
and institutional forms of racism to manifest in violent engagements with 
people of color. This is a separate, yet related, point to the issue raised by 
this Essay, which attempts to understand the broader doctrinal choices made 
by the Supreme Court that pave certain conceptual pathways and foreclose 
others. These doctrinal choices shape our understanding of excessive force 
claims as a dispute governed by an individualist Fourth Amendment rather 
than by constitutional text that may be more attuned to the group-based racial 
dynamics embedded in these violent interactions, such as the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
C. Implications 
It is in this scholarly and doctrinal context that focuses almost 
exclusively on the Fourth Amendment in understanding the parameters of 
police use of force that we ask a simple empirical question: Has it always 
been this way? Put differently, to the extent that Graham holds that matters 
concerning police use of force should be analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment, we seek to understand the on-the-ground impact that Graham 
has had by comparing post-Graham data on federal courts’ decision-making 
to a similar dataset comprised of cases decided before Graham’s doctrinal 
implementation. While the Supreme Court used Graham to push police 
excessive force analyses into the limited, individualized terrain of the Fourth 
Amendment—and scholars have remained largely silent on the potentiality 
of a different constitutional terrain—we seek to add to the existing literature 
by providing an empirical examination of what Graham’s doctrinal shift has 
meant for how federal courts understand and approach matters concerning 
police violence. 
 
 74 See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 337–40 (1998); 
Jordan Blair Woods, Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traffic Stops, 62 UCLA L. REV. 
672, 683–84 (2015). 
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III. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF PRE- AND POST-GRAHAM POLICE 
EXCESSIVE FORCE CASE LAW 
The preceding sections provided a historical, doctrinal, and scholarly 
context for our research questions: What impact did the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Graham have on how federal courts approach excessive force 
claims? How did federal courts analyze these claims before Graham? Did 
Graham shift this jurisprudence, or did it merely restate an approach that was 
already in consensus among federal courts? 
To have an empirical understanding of Graham’s impact in framing 
these adjudications, we conducted a qualitative study of federal case law 
twenty-six years prior to and after the 1989 Graham decision in order to 
capture how federal courts conceptualize matters pertaining to police 
excessive force and the legal claims they recognize and apply. Specifically, 
we systematically studied how federal courts analyze police excessive force 
claims pre- and post-Graham and the evolving roles played by the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. 
A. Methods 
In order to facilitate a qualitative comparison between the two time 
periods, we coded a random sample of 250 reported federal cases pertaining 
to police excessive force pre-Graham, 1962 to 1988, and 250 cases post-
Graham, from 1990 to 2016.75 We identified a dataset of cases through a 
Westlaw database search and used a random number generator to select cases 
that were then subjected to inclusion criteria until we had a total of 500 
qualifying cases.76 
We read and coded each qualifying case. We used five main codes: 
whether (“yes” or “no”) the Fourth Amendment, § 1983,77 the Fourteenth 
 
 75 The Court decided Graham v. Connor on May 15, 1989. Since this was a midyear decision, we 
excluded 1989 from our search to facilitate a more precise understanding of how courts approached police 
violence matters before and after the decision. 
 76 We randomly sampled 500 qualifying cases during this period in order to have a reasonable 
number of cases from which to draw inferences about the entire dataset. For the dataset of cases decided 
before Graham, we searched for “police,” “police officer,” and “excessive force or excessive use of force” 
for the given time period for reported federal cases, resulting in 1,029 hits. For the dataset comprised of 
cases decided after Graham, we conducted the same search, and it resulted in 2,708 hits. We chose to use 
the term “excessive force” for both time periods for continuity. Finally, for each time period, cases that 
did not have to do with police use of force in the context in which we are discussing it were excluded. 
Specifically, cases involving subjects like pretrial detention in jail or incarceration in prison or a medical 
facility were excluded because—in terms of the temporality of the criminal justice process—there are 
different constitutional analyses that arise that would affect our research question, which is solely focused 
on police use of force during their everyday patrols. 
 77 Section 1983 provides a civil right of enforcement for a violation of a constitutional right. It is 
generally held to not confer any substantive rights, but rather is a “method for vindicating federal rights 
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Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, or the race of victim or officer was 
discussed in the case.78 This provided us with a sense of the constitutional 
meta-narratives courts follow in this field, in terms of the frequency with 
which constitutional protection was mobilized. Regarding cases coded as 
“Fourteenth Amendment,” it is important to note that these data pertain to 
the Fourteenth Amendment overall—both in terms of substantive due 
process claims and equal protection claims in the excessive force realm. In 
reviewing and coding the cases, not all plaintiffs were clear about which 
portion of the Fourteenth Amendment they used to support their claims. 
Similarly, courts did not always rearticulate plaintiffs’ Fourteenth 
Amendment claims with specificity. Section III.B.3 of this Part discusses our 
findings that specifically engage the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. It was important to identify and track when courts 
explicitly mentioned this portion of the Fourteenth Amendment, as equal 
protection speaks directly to issues of race and group inequality beyond 
individuals. By examining both the overarching discourse surrounding the 
Fourteenth Amendment as well as particular claims concerning equal 
protection, we could better understand the ways in which they have 
separately as well as jointly been discussed. 
We also used an additional set of “subcodes” to understand what 
happened if and when the Fourteenth Amendment and Equal Protection 
Clause were coded as “yes.” In other words, just because the Fourteenth 
Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause was mentioned, it might have 
been in a negative fashion, and so we wanted to uncover the logic through 
which courts thought about these claims. Hence, if the Fourteenth 
Amendment was coded as “yes,” we then noted how courts discussed it. If 
the Equal Protection Clause was coded as “yes,” we similarly coded for the 
way courts discussed it. There were four possible subcodes: “rejected,” 
“accepted,” “not about race,” and “about race.” “Rejected” signifies that the 
court rejected the claim; “accepted” signifies that the court accepted the 
claim in some way; “not about race” means the plaintiff’s equal protection 
claim was not about race (e.g., arguing victim of police violence was part of 
 
elsewhere conferred.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). However, as the Court in 
Graham observed, “many courts have seemed to assume, as did the courts below in this case, that there 
is a generic ‘right’ to be free from excessive force, grounded not in any particular constitutional provision 
but rather in ‘basic principles of § 1983 jurisprudence.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989) 
(quoting Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 382 (4th Cir. 1987), vacated, 490 U.S. 1087 (1989) (remanding 
the case in light of Graham)). The Graham Court explicitly rejected this approach in favor of funneling 
all excessive force claims through the Fourth Amendment standard. Id. at 393–94. However, given that 
§ 1983 was one of the many ways in which federal courts understood the boundaries of these claims, we 
coded for it. 
 78 These codes were used because they are the concepts that we were interested in comparing between 
the pre- and post-Graham datasets. 
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another protected class); and “about race” signifies it was an equal protection 
claim that was actually about race. Finally, we coded to see if courts 
mentioned the race of the victim or officer involved in the violent 
engagement. If either was mentioned, we coded for the racial identity as 
described by the court in that case. 
This coding gives us a sense of each court’s approach and rationale—
particularly if the court includes or rejects claims beyond the Fourth 
Amendment. Below, Table 1 provides a visual description for how this 
coding functioned, with the six subcodes for the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
four subcodes for the Equal Protection Clause, and the five subcodes for race 
of victims and officers. 
TABLE 1: CODES AND SUBCODES 
If the Fourteenth 
Amendment was 
mentioned, how 
was it treated by 
court? 
If the Equal 
Protection Clause 
was mentioned, 
what was the 
result? 
If victim’s race was 
mentioned, how 
was it identified? 
If officer’s race was 
mentioned, how was 
it identified? 
•Plaintiff raises and 
court ignores or applies 
Fourth Amendment 
with no discussion 
•Rejected 
•Accepted 












•Plaintiff raises and 




in favor of Fourth 
Amendment 
•Plaintiff raises and 
court discusses and 
accepts but unfavorable 
to plaintiff 
•Plaintiff raises and 
dismissed or plaintiff 
raises and court ignores 
but doesn’t apply 
Fourth Amendment 
either 
•Raised by court 
without plaintiff or 
raised by defendants 
without plaintiff 
•Plaintiff raises and 
court discusses and 
accepts and finds 
favorably for plaintiff  
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B. Findings and Discussion 
The findings indicate that before Graham, federal courts infrequently 
relied upon the Fourth Amendment in adjudicating the constitutionality of 
police use of force (see Figure 1 below). Only 28.0% of the qualifying pre-
Graham cases include a discussion of the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the 
cases in this pre-Graham dataset (a) almost always discussed § 1983 
(96.0%); (b) sometimes discussed the Fourteenth Amendment (40.0%); and 
(c) rarely discussed the Equal Protection Clause specifically (10.4%), the 
race of the victim (15.6%), or the race of the officer (6.0%). Thus, the pre-
Graham data suggest that there was less emphasis on the Fourth Amendment 
during this time period. 
The post-Graham findings moved in a different direction, where 90.4% 
of the cases in this dataset discussed the Fourth Amendment. As the cause of 
action for individuals to claim a constitutional violation related to police 
excessive force, it is unsurprising that § 1983 remained prominent (96.4%). 
The Fourteenth Amendment was mentioned in 25.6% of the cases while the 
Equal Protection Clause was specifically mentioned in 5.2%. Race of the 
victim was mentioned in 17.2% of the sampled cases while race of the officer 
was mentioned 2.8% of the time. The post-Graham data suggest a significant 
focus on the Fourth Amendment and less on other areas of the Constitution.79 
This is not surprising, given the holding in Graham. 
The real surprise, however, is how seldom federal courts discussed the 
Fourth Amendment in relation to excessive force claims prior to Graham. 
These trends suggest that, post-Graham, the Supreme Court (a) effectively 
channeled police violence matters into the preexisting individualized 
constitutional terrain of the Fourth Amendment in a manner that substantially 
deviated from its pre-Graham jurisprudence (increasing from 28.0% of cases 
to 90.4%); (b) moved away from examining police violence matters through 
the Fourteenth Amendment (decreasing from 40.0% to 25.6%); and, finally, 
(c) moved away from the group-sensitive potentiality of equal protection 
analyses (decreasing from 10.4% to 5.2%) as well as continuing to avoid an  
explicit acknowledgement of the race of victims or officers across both time 
periods, which further entrenches notions of “colorblindness”80 in excessive 
 
 79 In evaluating excessive force claims, 79.6% of the cases mention Graham in some fashion. 
 80 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 183–84 (rev. ed. 2012) (“Our understanding of racism is therefore shaped by the most 
extreme expressions of individual bigotry, not by the way in which it functions naturally, almost invisibly 
(and sometimes with genuinely benign intent), when it is embedded in the structure of a social system.”); 
EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE 
OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 2 (4th ed. 2014) (describing the “ideology” of “color-blind racism” 
as explaining “contemporary racial inequality as the outcome of nonracial dynamics”). See generally 
OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE, BLINDED BY SIGHT: SEEING RACE THROUGH THE EYES OF THE BLIND (2014); TIM 
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force assessments. Put another way, the Supreme Court’s holding in Graham 
produced rather than mirrored any consensus or normative understanding 
regarding police excessive force claims being rendered as Fourth 
Amendment concerns. A more detailed discussion appears below.  
FIGURE 1: FEDERAL COURT EVALUATIONS OF POLICE VIOLENCE PRE- AND POST-GRAHAM 
1. Channeling Toward the Fourth Amendment 
This post-Graham focus on the Fourth Amendment is not shocking; 
plaintiffs likely thought it would not help their case to base excessive force 
claims on anything but the Fourth Amendment after the Graham Court’s 
declarative statement.81 However, what is important to keep in mind is the 
relatively low percentage of cases prior to Graham that discussed or 
referenced the Fourth Amendment. In other words, this means that a 
discussion of the Fourth Amendment pre-Graham was not all that common. 
The shift from 28.0% to 90.4% reflects a tremendous imposition of 
normative boundaries concerning constitutional claims regarding excessive 
force and the Supreme Court’s effort to channel this conversation towards 
 
WISE, COLORBLIND: THE RISE OF POST-RACIAL POLITICS AND THE RETREAT FROM RACIAL EQUITY 
(2010). 
 81 The Graham Court noted: 
Today we make explicit what was implicit in Garner’s analysis, and hold that all claims that law 
enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, 
investigatory stop, or other “seizure” of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment and its “reasonableness” standard, rather than under a “substantive due process” 
approach. Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional 
protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the 
more generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be the guide for analyzing these claims. 
Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 
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the individualist Fourth Amendment discourse and away from Fourteenth 
Amendment and equal protection claims that were, according to our data, 
perceived as legitimate jurisprudential pathways to follow prior to Graham. 
Thus, the data suggest that the Supreme Court did not necessarily choose the 
Fourth Amendment terrain for understanding the constitutional boundaries 
of excessive force claims because it reflected the most common 
understanding among the federal courts. Instead, the data suggest that this 
path was chosen due to other ideological commitments concerning how the 
Supreme Court thinks we ought to conceive and bound the relationship 
between constitutional text and plaintiffs’ rights to be free from state hyper-
aggressions. 
This discourse entrenching the primacy of the Fourth Amendment can 
be seen in the language used by the lower courts after the Graham decision. 
For example, in responding to a plaintiff’s excessive force claim, a district 
court in Pennsylvania characterized the Court’s holding in Graham as 
standing for the idea “that the sole source of constitutional protection against 
the use of force in the context of an arrest, investigatory stop or other type of 
seizure is the [F]ourth [A]mendment.”82 Similarly, a lower court in Alabama 
noted further that Graham stands as having “determined that the Fourth 
Amendment applies to all claims alleging a police officer used excessive 
force in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop or other ‘seizure’ of a free 
citizen.”83 Finally, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals wrote that “Graham 
v. Connor . . . held that all excessive force claims against law enforcement 
officers . . . must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective 
reasonableness’ standard.”84 
Altogether, this language typifies the discourse through which courts 
declare the Fourth Amendment the sole constitutional right involved in 
matters concerning police excessive force. The fact that there is more than a 
60% difference in how federal courts discuss the relevance of the Fourth 
Amendment to police excessive force claims pre- and post-Graham 
highlights the extent that, before Graham, lower courts deemphasized the 
Fourth Amendment in excessive force cases and were open to multiple ways 
of thinking through the constitutional standard. 
In addition, while the Fourth Amendment became centralized, what 
remained constant was the role of § 1983. Of the cases surveyed post-
 
 82 Janicsko v. Pellman, 774 F. Supp. 331, 341 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (emphasis added). 
 83 Hamilton v. City of Jackson, 508 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1053 (S.D. Ala. 2007) (emphasis added). 
 84 McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292, 293 (7th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added); see also Hancock v. 
Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1374 (6th Cir. 1992) (“Claims of excessive force under section 1983 are properly 
analyzed under the [F]ourth [A]mendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person, and 
its corresponding reasonableness standard.”). 
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Graham, 96.4% discussed § 1983, which means that most of the time if a 
Fourth Amendment claim was being made, it was being made alongside a 
§ 1983 claim. Similarly, 96.0% of pre-Graham cases featured § 1983. Thus, 
while § 1983 had a primary role in pre-Graham cases as compared to the 
Fourth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment rose to prominence after 
Graham to operate in conjunction with § 1983 in bringing police violence 
cases. This is consistent with the language in Graham, which identified a 
trend at the time where “many courts . . . seemed to assume, as did the courts 
below in this case, that there is a generic ‘right’ to be free from excessive 
force, grounded not in any particular constitutional provision but rather in 
‘basic principles of § 1983 . . . .’”85 The Graham court rejected this view, 
stating that “§ 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely 
provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred’”86—
thus largely bootstrapping the method for seeking a private remedy—
§ 1983—to the Fourth Amendment as the standard for what constitutes a 
violation of one’s constitutional rights.87 
2. Impeding the Fourteenth Amendment 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides an interesting alternative 
framework from which to think about excessive force by police. As one of 
the post-Civil War Reconstruction Amendments, it reflects a constitutional 
moment where law formally became cognizant of how differential group 
status can lead to inequality. This sensibility is reflected through claims of 
substantive due process protecting fundamental rights that arise, at least in 
part, out of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as through the amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause, which provides a more direct framework to address 
group inequities.88 
The data indicate that the Fourteenth Amendment had legitimate 
traction prior to Graham; appearing in 40.0% of the cases, it can be seen as 
part of the suite of mechanisms federal courts used to think through 
constitutional standards pertaining to excessive force. After Graham, there 
is a drop-off in the prevalence of the Fourteenth Amendment while the 
 
 85 Graham, 490 U.S. at 393. 
 86 Id. at 393–94 (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). 
 87 “In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983, analysis begins by identifying the 
specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force. . . . In most 
instances, that will be either the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the 
person, or the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments, which are the two primary 
sources of constitutional protection against physically abusive governmental conduct.” Id. at 394. The 
Court goes on to state that the Fourth Amendment is applicable to claims of excessive force when police 
are trying to make an arrest, while the Eight Amendment applies to excessive force claims made by a 
person who is incarcerated. Id. at 389–91. 
 88 See infra Section III.B.3. 
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Fourth Amendment rose to prominence. However, the fact that Fourteenth 
Amendment claims appeared 25.6% of the time in the post-Graham dataset 
is only half of the story. Of the times they did appear, in the vast majority of 
those instances (82.8%) the claims were ultimately unsuccessful in some 
way. Thus, Fourteenth Amendment claims were not received well when 
brought to courts: of the instances where they were included, only 10.9% of 
the time did the court actually discuss the claim, accept that the Fourteenth 
Amendment applied, and then find at least somewhat favorably for the 
plaintiff.89 The following Section describes how courts treated Fourteenth 
Amendment claims when they did appear, and how courts treated these 
claims in a mostly negative fashion. 
a. Blocking Fourteenth Amendment claims post-Graham 
There were two primary ways that a court would get rid of the post-
Graham Fourteenth Amendment claim when it was included: (1) ignoring 
the claim by not engaging with it (23.4%) or (2) discussing but rejecting the 
premise of the claim (i.e., that the Fourteenth Amendment is not relevant in 
the police violence context) without actually reaching the merits of the claim 
(42.2%). Hence, the court ignored or discussed but rejected the claim 65.6% 
of the time. This means that most of the time the court did not engage the 
Fourteenth Amendment claim fully, but disposed of it rather quickly. 
Furthermore, 12.5% of the time the court would actually engage with and 
accept the Fourteenth Amendment claim, but subsequently come to an 
unfavorable decision. 
Hence, even if the court accepted that perhaps the Fourteenth 
Amendment was applicable, it might still proceed to just reject the claim 
itself. Accordingly, 82.8% of the time the Fourteenth Amendment was met 
with resistance in one of these ways: the Fourteenth Amendment was not 
addressed or was explicitly rejected in favor of the Fourth Amendment 
(65.6%); the court found unfavorably for the plaintiff even though it accepted 
the claim’s viability (12.5%); or the claim was dismissed by the plaintiff 
herself or the court did not address it or the Fourth Amendment (4.7%).90 
(i) Ignoring the claim 
First, in those cases where the courts ignored or did not mention the 
claim (23.4%), the case would often consist of the plaintiff asserting the 
claim and the court just not addressing it again, and merely applying the 
 
 89 Of all 250 cases, this only occurred 2.8% of the time. 
 90 The court or the defendant(s) brought up the Fourteenth Amendment without the plaintiff doing 
so 6.3% of the time. In addition, to clarify the 4.7% statistic, this code included the situation wherein the 
court would not address the Fourteenth Amendment claim, but would not end up explicitly applying the 
Fourth Amendment either.  
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Fourth Amendment following Graham.91 For example, in one case from the 
District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, the court characterized 
the plaintiff’s claim as follows: “The Plaintiff has alleged the Defendants 
violated his rights to be secure in his person and free of excessive force under 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.”92 The court went on to 
immediately cite the Fourth Amendment and then Graham, as holding that 
“the Supreme Court determined that the Fourth Amendment applies to all 
claims alleging a police officer used excessive force in the course of an 
arrest, investigatory stop or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen.”93 The court 
concluded that, “[t]herefore, the Plaintiff’s claim of unreasonable or 
excessive force must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.”94 Thus, this 
is one way that a court could get rid of a Fourteenth Amendment claim, by 
merely not engaging with it and, instead, just using the Fourth Amendment 
and Graham to evaluate the suit.  
We note that in the “ignoring the claim” dataset, these are cases where 
the court describes the plaintiff as bringing both Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment claims and then proceeds only under a Fourth Amendment 
analysis. This discussion does not reflect some notion of incorporation 
(which is not mentioned in the cases) but rather a channeling of the excessive 
force claim into a singular Fourth Amendment analysis. What separates 
“ignoring” the claim from “rejecting” it (discussed below) is the level of 
engagement by the court. 
(ii)  Rejecting the claim 
Second, for those cases where courts engage to a degree with the 
Fourteenth Amendment claim but ultimately reject it (42.2%), the courts 
would generally note that the plaintiff filed a § 1983 claim for violation of 
her constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments for 
use of excessive force. In doing so, the courts would respond to a motion 
from the defendants, usually a motion for summary judgment, and then 
proceed to state that the Fourth Amendment—not the Fourteenth—is the 
applicable standard for a police violence matter. 
 
 91 See, e.g., Estate of Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Torres, 105 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1155 (S.D. Cal. 2015) 
(“Excessive force claims relating to police conduct during an arrest must be analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment and its reasonableness standard.” (emphasis added)); Stevens v. Metro. Transp. Auth. Police 
Dep’t, 293 F. Supp. 2d 415, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (including the Fourteenth Amendment, but stating that 
“[plaintiff] Stevens’s claim that the police officers used excessive force to effect his arrest is analyzed 
under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person”). 
 92 Hamilton v. City of Jackson, 508 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1053 (S.D. Ala. 2007).  
 93 Id. (emphasis added). 
 94 Id. (emphasis added). 
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For example, in a case from the Northern District of Ohio, the plaintiff 
brought suit against the police for using deadly force in violation of the 
decedent’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.95 The court wrote that 
the applicable standard is the Fourth Amendment: “A claim that the 
government used excessive force during the course of a seizure is analyzed 
under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard.”96 The 
court goes on to say that, while the plaintiff brings a Fourteenth Amendment 
claim as well as the Fourth Amendment claim, “[i]n the context of the right 
to be free from excessive force, however, the Sixth Circuit applies a Fourth 
Amendment seizure analysis to the claims.”97 The court thus held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not have a role in the suit, just the Fourth 
Amendment. 
In another example, a case from the Northern District of Illinois, the 
plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim against the police for excessive use of force 
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.98 Defendant officers argued 
that the plaintiff’s allegations under the Fourteenth Amendment must be 
dismissed because excessive force is “governed solely” by the Fourth 
Amendment.99 The court agreed with the defendants, writing that 
“[f]ollowing Graham v. Connor . . . it is clear that an excessive force 
claim . . . is ‘properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment[] . . . rather 
than under a substantive due process standard.’”100 As a result, the court 
decided to “strike [plaintiff’s] Fourteenth Amendment claims.”101 
Consequently, we see the court here explicitly rejecting plaintiff’s 
Fourteenth Amendment claim in favor of the Fourth. 
Last, in a case from the Western District of Tennessee, in his § 1983 
suit for excessive force, the plaintiff made both Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment claims.102 The defendant argued that the Fourteenth Amendment 
was inapposite, and the court proceeded to simply dismiss the claims the 
plaintiff brought under that Amendment.103 After dismissing the Fourteenth 
Amendment claim, the court then, citing Graham, applied the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness test.104 
 
 95 Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 584 F. Supp. 2d 974, 976, 989 (N.D. Ohio 2008). 
 96 Id. at 989–90. 
 97 Id. at 976 n.1. 
 98 Green v. Saenz, 812 F. Supp. 798, 801 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989)). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Phebus v. City of Memphis, 340 F. Supp. 2d 874, 882 (W.D. Tenn. 2004). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 882–83. 
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In these examples, the courts overtly state that the Fourth Amendment 
is to be used, and not the Fourteenth, referring to Graham as precedent for 
this doctrinal move. Hence, what we see here is the way in which courts 
solidify a doctrine that exclusively handles police excessive force cases with 
the Fourth Amendment through both ignoring the Fourteenth Amendment as 
well as explicit pronouncement of the dominion of the Fourth Amendment 
at the expense of the Fourteenth. 
b. Pre-Graham Fourteenth Amendment claims 
Prior to Graham, there was at least some room to make a cognizable 
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as opposed to 
only the Fourth Amendment.105 Whether ultimately successful or not, this 
could take different forms. For example, in a 1984 case from Pennsylvania, 
the plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim after being beaten by officers.106 After 
determining that the claim was based on excessive use of force, “the court 
construe[d] plaintiff’s complaint as claiming a deprivation of a liberty 
interest. Having determined that a liberty interest is involved, the court [had 
to then] decide whether plaintiff was deprived of that interest without due 
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”107 However, 
because the court determined the plaintiff had adequate state law remedies, 
the court dismissed his § 1983 claim.108 Therefore, while the plaintiff was 
unsuccessful in this Fourteenth Amendment claim, there was at least some 
engagement with it by the court. 
In a 1982 case from the Northern District of Ohio, the plaintiff brought 
suit against the local police department in Canton, Ohio, after police hit him 
 
 105 See, e.g., Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The Robinses argue that the 
right to be free from excessive use of force by the police is a substantive due process right protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Milstead, 705 F. Supp. 1426, 1436 (D. 
Ariz. 1988) (“A claim of excessive use of force in making an arrest is actionable under § 1983 as a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process . . . .” (citation omitted)); Kedra 
v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652, 666 (E.D. Penn. 1978) (“Another recurring aspect of the 
complaint is the repeated allegation of physical beatings. Such conduct is actionable as a civil rights 
violation since it deprives a person of his liberty interest in personal security without due process of law.” 
(citation omitted)); Campbell v. Buckles, 448 F. Supp. 288, 290 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (“The use of an 
excessive and unreasonable amount of force by state law enforcement officers in effectuating an arrest is 
a violation of the victim’s right to due process of law, Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 106 Dobson v. Green, 596 F. Supp. 122, 124 (E.D. Penn. 1984). 
 107 Id.; see also Reed v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 372 F. Supp. 686, 689 (E.D. Penn. 1974) (“This right [to 
be free from intentional and unprovoked assault by a police officer] is thought to arise from the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a right to be secure in one’s person which stands separate 
and apart from any specific right found in the Bill of Rights. Application of undue force by law 
enforcement officers thus deprives the individual of liberty without due process of law.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 108 Dobson, 596 F. Supp. at 125. 
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in the head with a “billy club.”109 Here, the court found in favor of the 
plaintiff, noting that it could not find that the officer “acted in a ‘good faith’ 
belief that it was necessary to use force to effect [plaintiff] Taylor’s arrest, 
when neither [the police officer] nor anyone else ever even attempted to 
arrest [the victim].”110 The court further recognized that the officer’s “actions 
were totally without provocation, justification, or probable cause, and they 
constitute an infringement by him of [the victim’s] constitutional rights in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”111 
In a case from New Jersey in 1979, a family member of the decedent, 
who was accidentally shot and killed as a bystander by police, brought a 
§ 1983 claim for damages.112 According to this court: “It is beyond dispute 
that one killed by a state police officer is deprived of his [F]ourteenth 
[A]mendment right to life.”113 The court rejected the defendant police 
department’s claim for summary judgment.114 Finally, in a case from the 
Northern District of New York in 1984, one of the plaintiffs was struck with 
a “five cell, foot long metal flashlight.”115 In examining the excessive force 
claim brought under § 1983 by the plaintiff, the court declared: “Application 
of undue force by law enforcement officers deprives an individual of the 
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment right to be secure in his person and thus 
represents a deprivation of liberty without due process of law.”116 The 
plaintiff received compensatory damages but no punitive damages against 
the officer.117 
What these data and examples show is that before Graham, lower courts 
were at least somewhat more able—or willing—to engage in an analysis of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and due process in evaluating excessive force 
claims and, in this way, offered a meaningful alternative to the limitations of 
the Fourth Amendment.118 While the pre-Graham engagement with the 
 
 109 Taylor v. Canton, Ohio Police Dep’t, 544 F. Supp. 783, 785 (N.D. Ohio 1982). 
 110 Id. at 788. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Popow v. City of Margate, 476 F. Supp. 1237, 1240 (D.N.J. 1979). 
 113 Id. at 1242. 
 114 Id. at 1240. 
 115 Keyes v. City of Albany, 594 F. Supp. 1147, 1151 (N.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 116 Id. at 1154 (citation omitted). 
 117 Id. at 1155. 
 118 See, e.g., Hornung v. Vill. of Park Forest, 634 F. Supp. 540, 544 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (“Claims of 
excessive force during arrest are cognizable under § 1983, and are generally analyzed as [F]ourteenth 
[A]mendment claims wherein the use of force is considered a potential deprivation of liberty without due 
process of law.” (citation omitted)); Starstead v. City of Superior, 533 F. Supp. 1365, 1368 (W.D. Wis., 
1982) (“[W]hile the alleged facts do not appear sufficient to sustain a cause of action arising out of the 
Eighth Amendment . . . they are sufficient to sustain a finding of a Fourteenth Amendment violation.” 
(citation omitted)). 
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Fourteenth Amendment offers an important point of comparison, we do not 
contend that this time period was ideal by any means. To be sure, substantive 
due process and fundamental rights analyses often reflect a form of 
constitutional individualism not unlike the Fourth Amendment context. 
Nevertheless, these data provide a glimpse into how courts approached these 
issues before Graham mandated that police violence cases would solely be 
addressed by the Fourth Amendment and “objective reasonableness.” By 
largely rejecting the premise that the Fourteenth Amendment might apply to 
excessive force claims through various means, the courts after Graham have 
clearly demarcated the permissible bounds of a police excessive force claim 
as solely being within the terrain of the Fourth Amendment.119 
3. Foreclosing Equal Protection and Propagating Colorblindness 
Specific discussion of the Equal Protection Clause arose in 13 of the 
250 cases (5.2%) sampled post-Graham. This means that, after Graham, 
explicit involvement of equal protection claims in this area of constitutional 
law is rare.120 Moreover, even if litigants did raise the claim, it was most often 
rejected. Of the 5.2% of cases where there was a specific discussion of the 
Equal Protection Clause, 12 out of 13 (92.3%) of the claims were rejected in 
some way by the court.121 Further, not all of these equal protection claims 
were “about race,” meaning that while an equal protection claim was being 
made, it may have been in furtherance of a claim based on another protected 
class or may have been a claim included without any actual support. Of the 
13 cases discussing equal protection, only 6 (46.2%) of these equal 
protection claims were specifically equal protection claims about race. 
a. Equal protection claims about race 
Five of the six cases that made explicit equal protection claims about 
race were ultimately rejected.122 Reasons why these claims were not accepted 
include: 
 
 119 See supra Section III.B.2.a. 
 120 While equal protection claims were not exactly common before Graham (10.4%), the point here 
is to show the rarity of equal protection after Graham regardless of how often these claims were made 
pre-Graham. By increasing the prominence of the Fourth Amendment, the Court impeded the viability 
of the Equal Protection Clause as part of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 121 This means that the plaintiff did not necessarily win, but the court did not outright reject the claim 
at that stage. 
 122 See Lockett v. New Orleans City, 607 F.3d 992 (5th Cir. 2010); McElroy v. City of Birmingham, 
903 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (N.D. Ala. 2012); Pryor v. City of Clearlake, 877 F. Supp. 2d 929 (N.D. Cal. 2012); 
Loharsingh v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Jackson v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 688 F. Supp. 2d 379 (W.D. Pa. 2010). 
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• After being assaulted during a traffic stop, the plaintiff’s equal 
protection claim failed because “the officers did not make any sort 
of racist remarks”;123 
• When a mentally ill, African-American man was shot with a stun 
gun and brought suit under the Fourth Amendment and Equal 
Protection Clause, the court found that his “equal protection claim 
warrant[ed] summary adjudication in favor of Defendants because 
he . . . presented no evidence that similarly situated individuals 
were treated differently or that Defendants pursued a course of 
action because of his race or mental illness”;124 
• After an African-American man was fatally shot in his home, his 
estate brought suit, including an Equal Protection Clause claim. 
However, the court found that the plaintiff needed to show that the 
officer, under the same or similar conditions, did not use force 
against white people in the same way;125 
• An African-American man brought suit for excessive force with an 
equal protection claim. The court noted that his claimed failed 
because “none of the officers made any derogatory racial remarks 
to Plaintiff.”126 
Just one case included a race-based equal protection claim that a court 
accepted (to a degree).127 This case represents less than 1% of all of the post-
Graham police violence cases surveyed. Put differently, in only one sampled 
case did the plaintiff actually try to mobilize the Equal Protection Clause to 
argue for a racialized component of the use of excessive force in the context 
of a police interaction and have any success at all by surviving summary 
judgment.128 
In this case, Hardy v. Emery, from the District Court of Maine, three 
African-American women brought suit regarding an altercation with a police 
officer in which one of the women—Andrea Hardy—sustained injuries when 
handcuffed.129 While handcuffing Hardy, the officer called another woman 
nearby—Quiana Harvey—a “nigger bitch” and other racist terms.130 In 
response, the court actually held that this kind of language—along with the 
 
 123 Jackson, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 395. 
 124 Pryor, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 935, 950. 
 125 McElroy, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 1231, 1254. 
 126 Loharsingh, 696 F. Supp. at 1106; see also the fifth case, Lockett, 607 F.3d at 1002 (“We conclude 
that he has not demonstrated facts sufficient to demonstrate a conspiracy to deprive him of equal 
protection and the required act in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused injury or deprivation of any 
right.”). 
127 Hardy v. Emery, 241 F. Supp. 2d 38 (2003). 
 128 Id. at 49–50 (survived summary judgment). 
 129 Id. at 42–43. 
 130 Id. at 43. 
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officer’s excessive actions—was sufficient for the plaintiffs’ case to survive 
summary judgment.131 
The constitutional terrain exemplified by Hardy serves as an imperfect 
example of where constitutional thought on police violence could go, from 
one restricted by the Fourth Amendment alone to one in which equal 
protection can potentially provide a deeper, group-based protection that 
recognizes the racialized dimensions of police violence. Procedurally, this 
may look as it did in this case, with a plaintiff bringing an excessive force 
claim under the Fourth Amendment paired with an equal protection claim, 
the combination of which could actually contemplate the fact that the force 
incident is intertwined with harm to a protected class. But, as can be seen in 
these data, this is exceedingly rare in the current constitutional moment. 
Finally, in looking at both the unsuccessful and (relatively) successful 
equal protection claims, what we see is some kind of requirement for overt 
racist behavior, such as language used by the officer in Hardy. The issue is 
that this case featured a situation where evidence clearly demonstrated racial 
animus coinciding with force. The problem with this is it remains within the 
bounds of uncovering the smoking gun of explicit racist intent and is, 
thereby, another doctrinal hurdle as it stays within the individualized “bad 
apple” calculus and not the structural one we contend is necessary for 
comprehending the racialized phenomenon that is police violence. 
b. Colorblindness 
Our finding that only 17.2% of cases after Graham discuss the race of 
the plaintiff(s) or victim(s) and only 2.8% discuss the race of the officer(s) 
highlights the deracialized nature of excessive force cases. There is a praxis 
of constitutional colorblindness evinced by how rarely race is discussed. 
While 15.6% of pre-Graham cases discussed race of victims (6.0% mention 
the race of the officer), the post-Graham numbers are incredibly low, such 
that we still see the further entrenchment of deracialization in excessive force 
claims that often have race at their center. 
By deracializing police use of force cases, the Court has effectively 
stripped the excessive force inquiry of its racialized component, which is a 
form of institutional colorblindness that ultimately perpetuates structural 
violence on communities of color by failing to acknowledge racially 
disparate results and the need for race-sensitive remedies. It is important to 
note how hampering equal protection and supporting colorblindness helps to 
maintain status quo racial inequalities. The discourse of colorblindness and 
the jurisprudential obstruction of equal protection claims both serve to create 
a socio-legal climate that bars access to substantive remedies for group-based 
 
 131 Id. at 48–49. 
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harm while simultaneously mythologizing formal equality in a purportedly 
post-civil rights, post-racial moment.   
In sum, these data draw attention to the rather significant shift ushered 
in by the Court’s holding in Graham, which made the Fourth Amendment 
the primary—if not sole—vehicle for constitutionally cognizable excessive 
force claims. The Court’s holdings on the Fourth Amendment and police 
violence have limited the excessive force doctrinal discussion, such that the 
Equal Protection Clause is viewed as having basically no place in excessive 
force jurisprudence.132 Thereby, the Court has been able to build a firewall 
against more critical, structural engagements with the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause by valorizing the Fourth 
Amendment. Hence, the dominant narrative has become that excessive 
violence by the police is simply a matter of rogue or poorly trained individual 
officers and not a function of the racial injustices that occur throughout the 
criminal justice system. It is only from this standpoint that it becomes 
possible to think that equal protection does not apply. 
CONCLUSION: GRAHAM, MCCLESKEY, AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
We have argued that the primary constitutional mechanism used to 
protect citizens from excessive use of force by the police—the Fourth 
Amendment, as interpreted by Graham—actually produces racialized police 
violence by failing to engage the racialized group dynamics that underlie 
police violence in communities of color.133 The doctrinal insistence that 
excessive force exists as an isolated and individual dynamic apart from 
broader racial inequalities renders the Fourth Amendment a relatively futile 
constitutional terrain from which to adjudicate these matters, allowing police 
excessive force to fester and reproduce without any check from the judiciary. 
The Fourth Amendment, as interpreted post-Graham, simply operates at the 
wrong level; its individualist nature cannot address a fundamentally 
structural problem. For this reason, the existing jurisprudence does more 
harm than good by standing as a proxy for protection and remediation while 
ultimately providing little to communities of color. 
Recognizing the futility of the Fourth Amendment is just the beginning 
of understanding the persistent problem of excessive force by the police.134 
A full social, legal, political and ethical engagement with police brutality and 
 
 132 See supra notes 81, 120. 
 133 See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 80; BUTLER, supra note 7. 
 134 See also ZIMRING, supra note 3, at 219 (“[T]he main arena for the radical changes necessary to 
save many hundreds of civilian lives in the United States each year is the local police department, not the 
federal courts or Congress, not state government, not local mayors or city councils, not even the hearts 
and minds of the police officers on the streets.”). 
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excessive force requires interventions at multiple levels beyond Supreme 
Court decisions. But the issues this Essay explores and the empirical findings 
herein are consequential in that they highlight how constitutional framings 
can be a legal determinant for injustice on the ground and the health 
disparities that often result from the injuries that stem from these violent 
encounters. Thus, we hope that these data can be the beginning of a broader 
conversation concerning police violence as a social and legal determinant of 
health and how police reform can improve minority health outcomes.135 
Throughout this Essay, we have suggested that the Fourteenth 
Amendment and its greater conceptual sensitivity to and awareness of group 
dynamics (as opposed to the Fourth Amendment’s one-dimensional 
individual rights framework) might be a more appropriate vehicle through 
which to adjudicate matters concerning excessive police force. While other 
scholars have suggested that aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment might be 
more appropriate than the Fourth Amendment in examining criminal 
procedure matters such as “stop and frisk,”136 our empirical contribution is to 
demonstrate (1) the indeterminacy of the constitutional standard before 
Graham (where the Fourth Amendment did not play a prominent role in 
shaping excessive force doctrine) and (2) the radical and exclusive shift 
toward individualism facilitated by Graham. We contend that a more group-
conscious framework aligned with the Fourteenth Amendment might be 
more appropriate in both remedying individual violations and creating the 
conditions for reform. Our hope is that this Essay will stimulate a 
conversation that can produce models that draw upon Fourteenth 
Amendment sensibilities that highlight the role of racial inequality and 
structural racism in precipitating excessive force by the police. 
Yet, we also understand how the current jurisprudence surrounding the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and specifically equal protection, is not 
unproblematic. Namely, the existing emphasis in equal protection doctrine 
on individual discriminatory intent instead of disparate impact or group 
harm—arising from Washington v. Davis,137 and exemplified by McCleskey 
 
 135 For a discussion of the health impacts of police violence, see Sirry Alang et al., Police Brutality 
and Black Health: Setting the Agenda for Public Health Scholars, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 662 (2017). 
 136 See, e.g., Brando Simeo Starkey, A Failure of the Fourth Amendment & Equal Protection’s 
Promise: How the Equal Protection Clause Can Change Discriminatory Stop and Frisk Policies, 
18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 131, 136 (2012) (“The answer must be the Equal Protection Clause. The Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, has been shredded.”). 
 137 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The intent doctrine creates an extremely truncated paradigm of how race 
and racism function in the present. For a discussion of its doctrinal evaluation, see Ian Haney-López, 
Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012).  
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v. Kemp138— prevents the effective remediation of racialized phenomena like 
police violence. To be sure, Graham’s positioning of police excessive force 
as an individualistic matter is troublesome unto itself. Yet, there is an 
interaction effect above and beyond jurisprudential silos of the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments when we read Graham alongside the individualist, 
intent-driven equal protection cases. 
As they currently stand, the individualism embedded in Graham, Davis, 
and McCleskey creates a doctrinal triad that precludes any kind of structural 
analysis of race and disparate impact, in police excessive force cases and 
beyond. Thus, the problem lies in the Court’s conceptualization of race and 
racism as well as the diminished role of social science evidence in helping 
us understand patterns and mechanisms of discrimination. We must be 
attentive to how the Court established its approach to police excessive force 
in Graham as being within the sole domain of the individualist Fourth 
Amendment and “objective reasonableness” at the same post-civil rights 
moment139 it was revising how race and equal protection were to be addressed 
with Davis and McCleskey.140 This suggests a deeper ideological and political 
shift in how the Court thinks about race, racism, and state culpability. 
Finally, it must be noted that, while constitutional law can seem lofty 
and abstract, it has real, material consequences that implicate everyday 
interactions between police and citizens. Police excessive force is a life-or-
death area of the law, dictated by the constitutional standards discussed in 
this Essay and materialized through the everyday interpretations of that law 
by police when they engage various communities. Graham and the 
contemporary constitutional law framework for police violence is part of the 
web of law, custom, and culture that enables police violence to remain an 
ingrained and routinized form of structural harm that communities of color 
are subjected to. Specifically, flawed constitutional law is an important 
determinant of health.141 By enabling normalized police violence and framing 
it as a series of disconnected individual disputes, constitutional law is liable 
 
 138 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 139 For a discussion of post-civil rights racial backlash and its impact on the federal courts, see Ian 
F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. 
L. REV. 985 (2007). 
 140 In a genealogy of these decisions, an ideological pattern emerges: Graham was decided just two 
years after McCleskey. Chief Justice William Rehnquist—joined by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor—
delivered the opinion in Graham (1989); joined Justice Lewis Powell in the opinion in McCleskey (1987); 
joined Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Garner (1985); and joined Justice Byron White in Washington v. 
Davis (1976). 
 141 See Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, Police Violence, Use of Force Policies, and Public 
Health, 43 AM. J. L. & MED. 279 (2017) (contending that use of force policies are an important site in 
disrupting police violence because they are the main domain for police departments to articulate and reify 
the constitutional law standards, and that this process has profound implications for public health). 
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for the broken bodies; loss of life and premature death; stress, anxiety, and 
depression; and community fragmentation that results from police excessive 
force.142 Thus, defective constitutional law—including the futile Fourth 
Amendment—combined with use of force policies developed by police 
departments that implement it, enables the violence done to individuals, 
communities, and public health. 
In sum, the constitutional matrix surrounding racialized police 
violence—which includes the Court’s conceptions of race and racism as well 
as Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—actively produces and perpetuates 
this violence by avoiding the structural nature of this problem and permitting 
police excessive force and killings to persist despite social movement and 
media attention. In order to address police violence—and all of the harms it 
creates—we must simultaneously critique Davis and McCleskey, while 
critically attending to Graham to render these constitutional individualisms 




 142 See Alang et al., supra note 135. 
